diff --git a/src/constants/dangerous-commands.ts b/src/constants/dangerous-commands.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..715e82d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/constants/dangerous-commands.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+/**
+ * Dangerous Command Patterns
+ *
+ * Patterns to detect and block dangerous bash commands that could
+ * cause irreversible damage to the system or data.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Category of danger for a blocked command
+ */
+export type DangerCategory =
+  | "destructive_delete"
+  | "privilege_escalation"
+  | "system_damage"
+  | "network_attack"
+  | "git_destructive"
+  | "credential_exposure";
+
+/**
+ * A blocked command pattern with metadata
+ */
+export interface BlockedPattern {
+  name: string;
+  pattern: RegExp;
+  category: DangerCategory;
+  description: string;
+  severity: "critical" | "high" | "medium";
+}
+
+/**
+ * Blocked command patterns organized by category
+ */
+export const BLOCKED_PATTERNS: BlockedPattern[] = [
+  // ==========================================================================
+  // Destructive File Operations - CRITICAL
+  // ==========================================================================
+  {
+    name: "rm_rf_root",
+    pattern: /\brm\s+(-[rfRvI]*\s+)*[\/]\s*$/,
+    category: "destructive_delete",
+    description: "Delete root filesystem",
+    severity: "critical",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "rm_rf_root_star",
+    pattern: /\brm\s+(-[rfRvI]*\s+)*[\/]\*/,
+    category: "destructive_delete",
+    description: "Delete all files in root",
+    severity: "critical",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "rm_rf_home",
+    pattern: /\brm\s+(-[rfRvI]*\s+)*~\s*$/,
+    category: "destructive_delete",
+    description: "Delete home directory",
+    severity: "critical",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "rm_rf_home_star",
+    pattern: /\brm\s+(-[rfRvI]*\s+)*~\/\*/,
+    category: "destructive_delete",
+    description: "Delete all files in home directory",
+    severity: "critical",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "rm_rf_star",
+    pattern: /\brm\s+(-[rfRvI]*\s+)*\*\s*$/,
+    category: "destructive_delete",
+    description: "Delete all files in current directory recursively",
+    severity: "high",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "rm_rf_git",
+    pattern: /\brm\s+(-[rfRvI]*\s+)*\.git\s*$/,
+    category: "destructive_delete",
+    description: "Delete git history",
+    severity: "high",
+  },
+
+  // ==========================================================================
+  // Privilege Escalation - CRITICAL
+  // ==========================================================================
+  {
+    name: "sudo_any",
+    pattern: /\bsudo\s+/,
+    category: "privilege_escalation",
+    description: "Sudo command (requires elevated privileges)",
+    severity: "critical",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "su_root",
+    pattern: /\bsu\s+(-\s*)?$/,
+    category: "privilege_escalation",
+    description: "Switch to root user",
+    severity: "critical",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "doas_any",
+    pattern: /\bdoas\s+/,
+    category: "privilege_escalation",
+    description: "Doas command (OpenBSD privilege escalation)",
+    severity: "critical",
+  },
+
+  // ==========================================================================
+  // System Damage - CRITICAL
+  // ==========================================================================
+  {
+    name: "dd_disk_wipe",
+    pattern: /\bdd\s+.*if=\/dev\/(zero|random|urandom).*of=\/dev\//,
+    category: "system_damage",
+    description: "Disk wipe with dd",
+    severity: "critical",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "chmod_777_root",
+    pattern: /\bchmod\s+(-R\s+)?777\s+\//,
+    category: "system_damage",
+    description: "Set insecure permissions on root",
+    severity: "critical",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "mkfs_format",
+    pattern: /\bmkfs\./,
+    category: "system_damage",
+    description: "Format filesystem",
+    severity: "critical",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "fork_bomb",
+    pattern: /:\(\)\s*{\s*:\s*\|\s*:\s*&\s*}\s*;?\s*:/,
+    category: "system_damage",
+    description: "Fork bomb",
+    severity: "critical",
+  },
+
+  // ==========================================================================
+  // Network Attacks - HIGH
+  // ==========================================================================
+  {
+    name: "curl_pipe_bash",
+    pattern: /\bcurl\s+.*\|\s*(ba)?sh/,
+    category: "network_attack",
+    description: "Download and execute script",
+    severity: "high",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "wget_pipe_bash",
+    pattern: /\bwget\s+.*\|\s*(ba)?sh/,
+    category: "network_attack",
+    description: "Download and execute script",
+    severity: "high",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "curl_pipe_sudo",
+    pattern: /\bcurl\s+.*\|\s*sudo/,
+    category: "network_attack",
+    description: "Download and execute with elevated privileges",
+    severity: "critical",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "nc_reverse_shell",
+    pattern: /\bnc\s+.*-e\s+\/bin\/(ba)?sh/,
+    category: "network_attack",
+    description: "Reverse shell with netcat",
+    severity: "critical",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "bash_reverse_shell",
+    pattern: /\/dev\/tcp\//,
+    category: "network_attack",
+    description: "Bash reverse shell",
+    severity: "critical",
+  },
+
+  // ==========================================================================
+  // Git Destructive - HIGH
+  // ==========================================================================
+  {
+    name: "git_force_push_main",
+    pattern: /\bgit\s+push\s+.*--force.*\b(main|master)\b/,
+    category: "git_destructive",
+    description: "Force push to main/master branch",
+    severity: "high",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "git_force_push_main_alt",
+    pattern: /\bgit\s+push\s+.*\b(main|master)\b.*--force/,
+    category: "git_destructive",
+    description: "Force push to main/master branch",
+    severity: "high",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "git_reset_hard_origin",
+    pattern: /\bgit\s+reset\s+--hard\s+origin/,
+    category: "git_destructive",
+    description: "Discard all local changes and reset to remote",
+    severity: "high",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "git_clean_force",
+    pattern: /\bgit\s+clean\s+(-[fd]+\s*)+/,
+    category: "git_destructive",
+    description: "Delete untracked files and directories",
+    severity: "medium",
+  },
+
+  // ==========================================================================
+  // Credential Exposure - MEDIUM
+  // ==========================================================================
+  {
+    name: "cat_env_file",
+    pattern: /\bcat\s+.*\.env\b/,
+    category: "credential_exposure",
+    description: "Read environment file (may contain secrets)",
+    severity: "medium",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "echo_secret_env",
+    pattern: /\becho\s+.*\$[A-Z_]*(SECRET|PASSWORD|KEY|TOKEN|CREDENTIAL)/i,
+    category: "credential_exposure",
+    description: "Echo secret environment variable",
+    severity: "medium",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "printenv_secrets",
+    pattern: /\bprintenv\s+(SECRET|PASSWORD|KEY|TOKEN|CREDENTIAL)/i,
+    category: "credential_exposure",
+    description: "Print secret environment variable",
+    severity: "medium",
+  },
+];
+
+/**
+ * Messages for blocked commands
+ */
+export const BLOCKED_COMMAND_MESSAGES = {
+  BLOCKED_TITLE: "Dangerous command blocked",
+  BLOCKED_PREFIX: "BLOCKED",
+  CATEGORY_DESCRIPTIONS: {
+    destructive_delete: "This command would delete critical files or directories",
+    privilege_escalation: "This command requires elevated privileges which could compromise system security",
+    system_damage: "This command could cause irreversible damage to the system",
+    network_attack: "This command could execute untrusted code or establish unauthorized network connections",
+    git_destructive: "This command could destroy git history or overwrite shared branches",
+    credential_exposure: "This command could expose sensitive credentials or secrets",
+  } as Record<DangerCategory, string>,
+  CANNOT_BYPASS: "This block cannot be bypassed for safety reasons.",
+  SUGGESTION: "If you need to perform this action, do it manually outside of CodeTyper.",
+};
diff --git a/src/services/dangerous-command-blocker.ts b/src/services/dangerous-command-blocker.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7c27d7f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/services/dangerous-command-blocker.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+/**
+ * Dangerous Command Blocker Service
+ *
+ * Detects and blocks dangerous bash commands before execution.
+ * This is a safety feature that cannot be bypassed, even with auto-approve.
+ */
+
+import {
+  BLOCKED_PATTERNS,
+  BLOCKED_COMMAND_MESSAGES,
+  type BlockedPattern,
+  type DangerCategory,
+} from "@constants/dangerous-commands";
+
+/**
+ * Result of checking a command for danger
+ */
+export interface DangerCheckResult {
+  blocked: boolean;
+  pattern?: BlockedPattern;
+  message?: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if a command matches any blocked pattern
+ */
+export const checkDangerousCommand = (command: string): DangerCheckResult => {
+  // Normalize command for checking
+  const normalizedCommand = command.trim();
+
+  for (const pattern of BLOCKED_PATTERNS) {
+    if (pattern.pattern.test(normalizedCommand)) {
+      return {
+        blocked: true,
+        pattern,
+        message: formatBlockedMessage(pattern),
+      };
+    }
+  }
+
+  return { blocked: false };
+};
+
+/**
+ * Format a user-friendly blocked message
+ */
+const formatBlockedMessage = (pattern: BlockedPattern): string => {
+  const categoryDescription =
+    BLOCKED_COMMAND_MESSAGES.CATEGORY_DESCRIPTIONS[pattern.category];
+
+  const lines = [
+    `[${BLOCKED_COMMAND_MESSAGES.BLOCKED_PREFIX}] ${pattern.name}: ${pattern.description}`,
+    "",
+    `Category: ${formatCategoryName(pattern.category)}`,
+    `Severity: ${pattern.severity.toUpperCase()}`,
+    "",
+    categoryDescription,
+    "",
+    BLOCKED_COMMAND_MESSAGES.CANNOT_BYPASS,
+    BLOCKED_COMMAND_MESSAGES.SUGGESTION,
+  ];
+
+  return lines.join("\n");
+};
+
+/**
+ * Format category name for display
+ */
+const formatCategoryName = (category: DangerCategory): string => {
+  const names: Record<DangerCategory, string> = {
+    destructive_delete: "Destructive Delete",
+    privilege_escalation: "Privilege Escalation",
+    system_damage: "System Damage",
+    network_attack: "Network Attack",
+    git_destructive: "Git Destructive",
+    credential_exposure: "Credential Exposure",
+  };
+  return names[category];
+};
+
+/**
+ * Get all blocked patterns (for configuration UI)
+ */
+export const getBlockedPatterns = (): readonly BlockedPattern[] => {
+  return BLOCKED_PATTERNS;
+};
+
+/**
+ * Check if a command is safe (inverse of dangerous check)
+ */
+export const isCommandSafe = (command: string): boolean => {
+  return !checkDangerousCommand(command).blocked;
+};
+
+/**
+ * Get categories of dangerous commands
+ */
+export const getDangerCategories = (): DangerCategory[] => {
+  return [
+    "destructive_delete",
+    "privilege_escalation",
+    "system_damage",
+    "network_attack",
+    "git_destructive",
+    "credential_exposure",
+  ];
+};
diff --git a/src/tools/bash/execute.ts b/src/tools/bash/execute.ts
index ff7f0bc..df4bbad 100644
--- a/src/tools/bash/execute.ts
+++ b/src/tools/bash/execute.ts
@@ -9,7 +9,9 @@ import {
   BASH_MESSAGES,
   BASH_DESCRIPTION,
 } from "@constants/bash";
+import { BLOCKED_COMMAND_MESSAGES } from "@constants/dangerous-commands";
 import { promptPermission } from "@services/core/permissions";
+import { checkDangerousCommand } from "@services/dangerous-command-blocker";
 import { bashParams } from "@tools/bash/params";
 import {
   truncateOutput,
@@ -36,6 +38,17 @@ const createDeniedResult = (description: string): ToolResult => ({
   error: BASH_MESSAGES.PERMISSION_DENIED,
 });
 
+const createBlockedResult = (description: string, message: string): ToolResult => ({
+  success: false,
+  title: BLOCKED_COMMAND_MESSAGES.BLOCKED_TITLE,
+  output: "",
+  error: message,
+  metadata: {
+    blocked: true,
+    reason: description,
+  },
+});
+
 const createTimeoutResult = (
   description: string,
   output: string,
@@ -179,6 +192,16 @@ export const executeBash = async (
   const description =
     args.description ?? `Running: ${command.substring(0, 50)}`;
 
+  // SAFETY: Check for dangerous commands BEFORE permission check
+  // This block cannot be bypassed, even with auto-approve
+  const dangerCheck = checkDangerousCommand(command);
+  if (dangerCheck.blocked) {
+    return createBlockedResult(
+      dangerCheck.pattern?.description ?? "Dangerous command",
+      dangerCheck.message ?? "Command blocked for safety",
+    );
+  }
+
   const allowed = await checkPermission(
     command,
     description,