NOTE: This change must be reverted with previous deletes so that it code remains in build-able state.
This change deletes old styling code and replaces it with a simplified styling algorithm.
The mental model for the new algorithm is:
- Create a linked list of styling bindings in the order of priority. All styling bindings ere executed in compiled order and than a linked list of bindings is created in priority order.
- Flush the style bindings at the end of `advance()` instruction. This implies that there are two flush events. One at the end of template `advance` instruction in the template. Second one at the end of `hostBindings` `advance` instruction when processing host bindings (if any).
- Each binding instructions effectively updates the string to represent the string at that location. Because most of the bindings are additive, this is a cheap strategy in most cases. In rare cases the strategy requires removing tokens from the styling up to this point. (We expect that to be rare case)S Because, the bindings are presorted in the order of priority, it is safe to resume the processing of the concatenated string from the last change binding.
PR Close#34616
This adds `insertTStyleValue` but does not hook it up to anything yet.
The purpose of this function is to create a linked-list of styling
related bindings. The bindings can be traversed during flush.
The linked list also keeps track of duplicates. This is important
for binding to know if it needs to check other styles for reconciliation.
PR Close#34004
Prior to this commit, values wrapped into SafeStyle were not handled correctly in [style.prop] bindings in case style sanitizer is present (when template contains some style props that require sanitization). Style sanitizer was not unwrapping values in case a given prop doesn't require sanitization.As a result, wrapped values were used as final styling values (see https://github.com/angular/angular/blob/master/packages/core/src/render3/styling/bindings.ts#L620). This commit updates the logic to unwrap safe values in sanitizer in case no sanitization is required.
PR Close#34286
Most of the use of `document` in the framework is within
the DI so they just inject the `DOCUMENT` token and are done.
Ivy is special because it does not rely upon the DI and must
get hold of the document some other way. There are a limited
number of places relevant to ivy that currently consume a global
document object.
The solution is modelled on the `LOCALE_ID` approach, which has
`getLocaleId()` and `setLocaleId()` top-level functions for ivy (see
`core/src/render3/i18n.ts`). In the rest of Angular (i.e. using DI) the
`LOCALE_ID` token has a provider that also calls setLocaleId() to
ensure that ivy has the same value.
This commit defines `getDocument()` and `setDocument() `top-level
functions for ivy. Wherever ivy needs the global `document`, it calls
`getDocument()` instead. Each of the platforms (e.g. Browser, Server,
WebWorker) have providers for `DOCUMENT`. In each of those providers
they also call `setDocument()` accordingly.
Fixes#33651
PR Close#33712
In VE the `Sanitizer` is always available in `BrowserModule` because the VE retrieves it using injection.
In Ivy the injection is optional and we have instructions instead of component definition arrays. The implication of this is that in Ivy the instructions can pull in the sanitizer only when they are working with a property which is known to be unsafe. Because the Injection is optional this works even if no Sanitizer is present. So in Ivy we first use the sanitizer which is pulled in by the instruction, unless one is available through the `Injector` then we use that one instead.
This PR does few things:
1) It makes `Sanitizer` optional in Ivy.
2) It makes `DomSanitizer` tree shakable.
3) It aligns the semantics of Ivy `Sanitizer` with that of the Ivy sanitization rules.
4) It refactors `DomSanitizer` to use same functions as Ivy sanitization for consistency.
PR Close#31934
This patch is one of the final patches to refactor the styling algorithm
to be more efficient, performant and less complex.
This patch enables sanitization support for map-based and prop-based
style bindings.
PR Close#30667
There is an encoding issue with using delta `Δ`, where the browser will attempt to detect the file encoding if the character set is not explicitly declared on a `<script/>` tag, and Chrome will find the `Δ` character and decide it is window-1252 encoding, which misinterprets the `Δ` character to be some other character that is not a valid JS identifier character
So back to the frog eyes we go.
```
__
/ɵɵ\
( -- ) - I am ineffable. I am forever.
_/ \_
/ \ / \
== == ==
```
PR Close#30546
The `Δ` caused issue with other infrastructure, and we are temporarily
changing it to `ɵɵ`.
This commit also patches ts_api_guardian_test and AIO to understand `ɵɵ`.
PR Close#29850
Google3 detected circular references here, so splitting up this rather hodge-podge list of functions into slightly better organizational units.
PR Close#28382
This commit adds a devMode-only check which will throw if a user
attempts to bind a property that does not match a directive
input or a known HTML property.
Example:
```
<div [unknownProp]="someValue"></div>
```
The above will throw because "unknownProp" is not a known
property of HTMLDivElement.
This check is similar to the check executed in View Engine during
template parsing, but occurs at runtime instead of compile-time.
Note: This change uncovered an existing bug with host binding
inheritance, so some Material tests had to be turned off. They
will be fixed in an upcoming PR.
PR Close#28537
Prior to this change we performed prop and attr name validation at compile time, which failed in case a given prop/attr is an input to a Directive (thus should not be a subject to this check). Since Directive matching in Ivy happens at runtime, the corresponding checks are now moved to runtime as well.
PR Close#28054
This commit adds sanitization for `elementProperty` and `elementAttribute` instructions used in `hostBindings` function, similar to what we already have in the `template` function. Main difference is the fact that for some attributes (like "href" and "src") we can't define which SecurityContext they belong to (URL vs RESOURCE_URL) in Compiler, since information in Directive selector may not be enough to calculate it. In order to resolve the problem, Compiler injects slightly different sanitization function which detects proper Security Context at runtime.
PR Close#27939
By providing a top level sanitization methods (rather than service) the
compiler can generate calls into the methods only when needed. This makes
the methods tree shakable.
PR Close#22540
